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Within the empiricist tradition, it is often taken for granted that the
laws of nature are contingent. According to this view, metals could
contract upon heating instead of expanding as they actually do. I shall
attack this view first, by questioning an essential assumption on which
it depends, and second by giving a positive reason to think that at least
some laws are necessary. I begin by looking a little closer at the reasons
for the contingency view of laws.
1. Lewis’ and Armstrong’s combinatorialism and
the contingency theory of laws
David Lewis and David Armstrong adopt radically opposite positions
with respect to the metaphysical interpretation of modality. For Lewis,
there are other possible worlds that are just as real as ours. For Arm-
strong, other possible worlds are ways to combine the particulars and
universals of our actual world into states of affairs. For Armstrong,
there is only one actual world, which is the one we inhabit. It is abso-
lutely actual. For Lewis, actuality is a relative notion: our own world
is indeed actual, but only relatively to us. Actuality is an indexical,
context-sensitive concept that picks out different worlds at different
world-contexts. In this world Lewis is a philosopher, but some other
world represents him as being a plumber. The world inhabited by Lewis
the plumber is the actual world for Lewis the plumber although it is
only a possible world for Lewis the philosopher1. From the viewpoint of
Lewis’ realism with respect to possible worlds, Armstrong is a “linguis-
tic ersatzer” who holds that the conceptual work done by postulating
possible worlds can be done by linguistic constructions. If it can be done
- a thesis Lewis (Lewis, 1986a) denies – parsimony dictates to prefer a
1Lewis denies overlap with respect to individuals between possible worlds, so Lewis the
plumber is not the very same individual as Lewis the philosopher but only his counterpart
in virtue of some appropriate similarity relation. See below, section 4.
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sparse metaphysical doctrine with only one real world to a luxurious
doctrine with an infinity of real worlds.
Armstrong and Lewis also adopt radically different positions with
respect to the issue of the metaphysical nature of laws. Here Armstrong
is the realist who thinks of laws as objectively existing relations between
universals2 whereas Lewis adopts the Humean or anti-realist position
that there is no necessity in nature. Laws are defined relatively to a
hypothetical ideal science: the laws are the axioms and theorems of an
ideal scientific theory3.
In spite of this important disagreement in the metaphysical interpre-
tation of both possible worlds and laws, Armstrong and Lewis agree in
following the pretheoretical intuition that the laws of nature are con-
tingent. Even if in our actual world it is a law that all metals expand
when their temperature rises, both hold that it is, nevertheless, possi-
ble that a metallic object contracts upon heating. Instead of relying
directly on intuitions, both Lewis and Armstrong argue for the thesis of
the contingency of laws with some version of the principle of combina-
tion. There is however an important difference between Lewis’ “principle
of recombination” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 87) and Armstrong’s (Armstrong,
1989) combinatorialist theory of possibility. For Armstrong, possibili-
ties arise from combining logical atoms, which are the constituents of
states of affairs, i.e. particulars and universals. For Lewis, possibilities
arise from the rearrangement of the distribution of intrinsic qualities
over space-time locations. As we shall see, this difference has important
consequences for the issue of the modal status of laws.
At first sight, David Lewis’ position with respect to the issue of the
modal status of laws seems straightforward: “There might have been
altogether different laws of nature” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 1); “there are [. . . ]
worlds where [. . . ] totally different laws govern the doings of alien par-
ticles with alien properties” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 2). Speaking of the rival
doctrine of “strong laws” according to which laws are necessary, he says:
“If a theory of strong laws is to be credible, it had better provide not
only a sense of ‘possible’ in which violations of laws are impossible, but
also another sense in which violations of laws are possible. Perhaps that
second sense cannot be provided. In that case the doctrine of strong laws
is not credible enough to deserve consideration.” (Lewis and Langton,
1998, p.122) Lewis’s reason for holding that the laws are contingent lies
2Cf. Armstrong (Armstrong, 1983). Dretske (Dretske, 1977) and Tooley (Tooley, 1987) hold
similar positions.
3This is the famous “best-system analysis of laws” which Lewis adopts from Ramsey. Cf.
Lewis (Lewis, 1973; Lewis, 1983; Lewis, 1994).
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in his adherence to the fundamental doctrine of Humean supervenience
according to which “all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. [. . . ]
For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There
is no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All
else supervenes on that.” (Lewis, 1986b, pp. ix f.) This doctrine implies
that objectively, laws are nothing but regularities. To distinguish them
from accidental coincidences, the best-system analysis says that, among
all regularities, the laws are those that science will eventually pick out
as axioms and theorems of the ideal theory. It is an essential part of
this Humean doctrine that there are no necessary connections between
what happens at different points, between the qualities instantiated at
different spatio-temporal locations. A quality instantiated at one point
imposes no modal constraint whatsoever on the qualities instantiated
elsewhere. Anything can possibly be juxtaposed to anything. To take
Lewis’ example, it is a lawful regularity obtaining in this world that
bread-eating prevents starving (Lewis, 1986a, p. 91). But this regular-
ity might possibly not obtain. There are worlds in which I eat bread
and nevertheless starve. Lewis generalizes this idea into a “principle of
recombination [. . . ] Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything
can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with
anything else.” (Lewis, 1986a, pp. 87f.)
One important difference with respect to Armstrong’s version of the
doctrine of the contingency of laws is the following. Lewis’ thesis of
the contingency of laws applies directly only to laws implying neces-
sary connections between qualities instantiated at different space-time
locations. The “distinct existences” (to use Armstrong’s terminology)
that can be, according to Lewis, combined in all ways are qualities that
fully occupy a location. This implies that Lewis’ Humean combinatori-
alism does not automatically classify all laws as contingent. The thesis
that qualities instantiated at different spatio-temporal locations are only
contingently linked, implies that what are often called causal laws are
contingent. Such laws link what happens at different spatio-temporal
locations. This is the result Lewis focuses on when he says that the
principle of recombination settles “the question whether laws of nature
are strictly necessary. They are not; or at least laws that constrain what
can coexist in different positions are not” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 91).
However, not all laws are causal laws, and Lewis’ Humean principle
of recombination of qualities instantiated at different locations does not
imply that these other laws, and in particular, the laws of association
are contingent. Lewis notes only in passing, and somewhat tentatively,
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that his strategy “to take a Humean view about laws and causation,
and use it instead as a thesis about possibility” (ibid.) does not imply
free combinability with respect to the qualities that are co-exemplified
at the same space-time location. Thus, Lewis admits that “perhaps”
(ibid.) his Humean argument entails the contingency of laws only “with
the exception of laws constraining what can coexist at a single position,
for instance the law (if such it be) that nothing is both positive and
negative in charge.” (ibid.) In fact, having noted that the Humean
doctrine doesn’t force upon him the contingency of such laws, Lewis
says that we have no means to know whether such incompatibilities are
necessary or not. This is a question on which
there seems to be no way at all of fixing our modal opinions, and we
just have to confess our irremediable ignorance. I think one question of
this kind concerns incompatibility of natural properties. Is it absolutely
impossible for one particle to be both positively and negatively charged?
Or are the two properties exclusive only under the contingent laws of
nature that actually obtain? I do not see how we can make up our
minds; or what guarantee we have that there must be some way to
settle the question. [. . . ] Whatever the truth may be, it isn’t up to us.
(Lewis, 1986a, p. 114)4
His agnosticism about (epistemically) possible natural incompatibili-
ties makes Lewis combinatorialism weaker than Armstrong’s. For Lewis,
it may be the case that the quality of being positive in charge is not a
combinatorial atom. If it is not, then it cannot combine with the quality
of being negative in charge at the very same time and place. In that
case there would be a link of natural necessity between different qualities
instantiated at the same time and place. For Armstrong (Armstrong,
1989), such necessary relations can only have a logical or mereological
origin5. We can express the difference in the following way: Armstrong
takes possibilities to arise from combinations of “distinct existences”
which are bare particulars and simple universals whereas Lewis takes
possibilities to arise from combinations of “distinct existences” which
are “thick particulars”: the totality of all qualities instantiated at a
given space-time point. Within one combinatorial atom, there may be
links of necessity. It follows from this difference in their respective ac-
counts of independence and combinatorial possibility that the existence
4I disagree. As I shall argue below, our ignorance in this case is not irremediable. It stems
from our scientific ignorance of whether these properties are two different determinates of a
given determinable. If they are then it is logically and thus metaphysically impossible that
they are instantiated at the same time and place.
5I shall criticize this thesis of Armstrong’s below, in section 6.
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of necessary laws is compatible with Lewis’ metaphysical framework, but
not with Armstrong’s.
2. Do universals have a quiddity, suchness or
haecceity?
One can understand the debate on the modal status of laws in two
ways. On a strong reading of the thesis of the necessity of laws, they
hold in all possible worlds. I agree with Armstrong and Lewis that this
is not plausible. The controversial thesis that I try to defend against
Armstrong and Lewis is weaker. It says that all possible worlds that
share our universals also share our laws. The laws are necessary in
the weak sense that they hold in all those possible worlds that share
our actual universals. Armstrong and Lewis (and many others, such as
Mellor, 1993 and Mellor, 1997) however think that laws are not even
necessary in this weaker sense, and that there are possible worlds that
share our universals but not our laws. According to this doctrine of the
contingency of laws, a given universal F that is nomically linked to a
universal G in the actual world is not linked to G in some other possible
world. Although it is a law in the actual world that metals expand when
heated, there are possible worlds where it is instead a law that metals
contract when heated. The contingency thesis I am arguing against
holds not only that some possible worlds do not share our laws (this is a
thesis I accept and which corresponds to the denial of the strong thesis
according to which our laws hold in all possible worlds), but that the
very same property of being metallic which exists in the actual world
might be differently related to other properties, such as expanding and
contracting, than it is in the actual world.
I shall now offer the following argument against the contingency view
of laws. Presupposing for the sake of this discussion that laws are rela-
tions between universals, the contingency theory holds that one universal
might have different nomical relations to other universals than it has in
the actual world. If laws are contingent, universals are embedded in
different laws in different possible worlds. Consider an actual universal
U and a non-actual universal U∗ in some heteronomic world. Accord-
ing to the contingency view, U and U∗ may be identical although their
nomological properties differ, in other words, although U and U∗ are
nomically linked to different properties. There seem to be two ways to
construe such a cross-world identity claim for universals. According to
the first, one universal can literally exist in more than one possible world.
In section 4, I shall argue that this assumption leads to the conclusion
that at least some laws are necessary.
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According to the second way to construe the trans-world identity of U
and U∗, they are the same universal although they are not logically and
numerically identical (in so far as they differ with respect to the laws in
which they are embedded) because they have the same essence6. In this
section and the following, I attack two arguments for the existence of
such an essence. According to this construal of the contingency view, U
and U∗ are different ways the same universal could have been: they dif-
fer nomologically but share a non-qualitative7 essence, something which
has been variously called “haecceity” (Rosenkrantz, 1993), “suchness”
(O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover, 1997) or “quiddity” (Armstrong, 1989).
Laws can then be considered as contingent relations between universals
because the identity of the universals is independent of the laws, being
determined instead by their quiddity. How can we make sense of the
hypothesis that universals have a quiddity or non-qualitative essence?
One way is to conceive of the quiddity of a universal in a purely formal
way. It can equally well be applied to argue for the “haecceity” of indi-
viduals, and indeed for the haecceity of anything at all that exists. Each
individual, says Rosenkrantz (Rosenkrantz, 1993), has its own haecceity,
in virtue of the simple fact of being identical with itself. Given that it
is true for every x that x = x, one can consider “= x” as equivalent to
the predicate “being identical to x”. Then (∀x)(x = x) is equivalent to
(∀x) Fxx
where “Fx” is the predicate “is identical to x”. Rosenkrantz takes it
for granted that one is ontologically committed to the reference of the
predicate, i.e. to the existence of the property Fx which is x’s haecceity.
In other words, he proves the existence of a haecceity Fx for each and
every individual x, by supposing that every predicate expresses a prop-
erty, at least if the predicate is satisfied by something. Given that for
each x there is something satisfying the predicate Fx, there is a property
6Mere similarity is not sufficient for identity. Without an essence, with all properties equally
contributing to the identity of a universal, only perfect similarity, i.e. having all properties
in common, is sufficient for identity. This is equivalent to the first option.
7There seems to be still another possibility. The essence of a universal could consist of
part of its properties. As I shall argue below, all second-order properties of a universal are
nomological properties, i.e. nomic links to other universals. Therefore, such an essence would
consist of part of the nomological properties of the universal. I think this option must be
ruled out because there is no principled reason why some of the laws in which a universal
takes part, should be more essential to its identity than others.
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expressed by that predicate which is x’s haecceity8. As a definition of
what it is to be the haecceity of an individual, Rosenkrantz offers:
F is a haecceity =df. (∃x)(F is the property of being identical with x.)
(Rosenkrantz, 1993, p. 3)
With respect to universals, e.g. Redness, he argues in an analo-
gous, purely formal way, that the proposition “that (∃x)(x is red)”
(Rosenkrantz, 1993, p. 12) implies the proposition “that (∃x) (x = Red-
ness)” (ibid.).
This inference presupposes the thesis, already implicitly relied on in
the argument for the haecceity of individuals, that any use of a pred-
icate carries ontological commitment to the reference of the predicate.
To arrive at the existence of the haecceity of the universal Redness,
Rosenkrantz uses the same argument once again, but on a higher onto-
logical level9. He argues that in
(∃x)(x = Redness )
one can consider “=Redness” as a predicate FR, and then spell out the
presupposed ontological commitment to the property FR refers to. This
is the haecceity (or quiddity) of Redness, “the property of being identical
to Redness”.
I think one can grant that there is a sense in which such properties
exist. They belong to what Lewis calls “abundant” (Lewis, 1986a, p.
59; Lewis, 1983, pp. 345f.) properties and opposes to the “sparse” or
“natural” properties. Natural properties are such that it can only be
found out a posteriori that they are exemplified. The property of being
8In the case of particulars, Rosenkrantz (Rosenkrantz, 1993, chap. 2), following Adams
(Adams, 1979), adds a less formal argument for the existence of haecceities, from the possi-
bility of a world containing strictly indiscernible individuals: if they are nevertheless numer-
ically different, postulating a haecceity for each is the only possible explanation available. I
have two objections against this argument: First, such an argument cannot establish that
haecceities actually exist; second, it is a non sequitur even with respect to those possible
worlds where there are strictly indiscernible individuals. As the reasoning about quantum
mechanical indistinguishable particles below (section 3) shows, such a possibility only shows
that countability does not always go together with individual identity; such individuals are
numerically more than one but this alone does not suffice to establish that necessarily each
has its own individual identity. Cf. (Lowe, 1998).
9In the case of universals, Rosenkrantz (Rosenkrantz, 1993, p. 132; and note 55) explicitly
says that such a formal argument suffices if it combined with the principle according to which
“necessarily, if something has a haecceity, then everything has a haecceity” (Rosenkrantz,
1993, p. 13). I think that universals do not obey the same criteria of identity as particulars.
Therefore, it is not obvious that arguments in favour or against haecceity carry over from
the case of particulars to the case of universals. A crucial relevant difference is that it
makes sense to say that there are (e.g. in a quantum-mechanical system) countably many
indistinguishable particulars, but not to say that there are countably many indistinguishable
universals. See below, section 3.
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red is a natural property in this sense. However, once the existence
of the property of being red is granted, it is a matter of pure logic to
show that redness has a haecceity in Rosenkrantz’ sense, by showing
that it is identical with itself. A haecceity, so understood, is not a
natural property, for insofar as some entity x exists, logic alone suffices
to establish that x has a haecceity.
However, Rosenkrantz’ shadowy haecceities cannot ground transworld
identity of universals embedded in different laws, and therefore cannot
help justify the contingency view of laws. For on Rosenkrantz’ con-
strual of haecceities, they are not associated with criteria allowing to
judge whether two singular expressions referring to haecceities refer to
the same or different haecceities. So how could the defender of the con-
tingency of laws rely on them to ground the claim that universals U
and U∗, being in different worlds and embedded in different laws, share
the same haecceity? Rosenkrantz’ way to introduce them only guaran-
tees that each has a haecceity (in a sense in which any existing entity
whatsoever has a haecceity), but not that both have the same haecceity.
3. An argument for quiddity from the possibility
of indistinguishable universals
O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover (O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover, 1997)
give a less formal argument for the thesis that it is at least possible that
universals have quiddity (they call it “suchness”, leaving “haecceity” for
individuals). They ask us to conceive of the possible situation in which
there are two indistinguishable universals, Fness and Gness. It may
indeed seem plausible at first sight that if it were possible that there exist
two numerically different but qualitatively perfectly indistinguishable
universals, this would give us a reason to postulate that each has its
own nonqualitative quiddity which makes it different from the other.
Against this reasoning, I offer two arguments. First, the hypothe-
sis of two indistinguishable universals violates the Causal Criterion of
Identity that follows from another traditional and widely shared meta-
physical principle, the Causal Criterion of Reality (CCR)10. This latter
principle says that something is real if and only if it is capable of mak-
ing a difference to causal interactions or causal processes11. Now the
10I develop this argument in Kistler, 2002.
11The status of this principle as an ultimate criterion of reality can and has been doubted.
Armstrong has argued that it is ”not [. . . ] a necessary truth, but merely good methodology”
(Armstrong, 1984, p. 256). This is correct but I think that, in metaphysics, good methodol-
ogy is the only accessible criterion of truth: God’s point of view being inaccessible, we are
condemned to adopt a naturalistic standpoint. When we make the metaphysical claim that
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Causal Criterion of Identity (CCI) follows if the CCR is applied to the
properties of an entity. The identity of an entity is determined by those
of its properties whose exemplification makes a causal difference. The
situation imagined by O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover’s is incompatible
with the CCI: For the universals Fness and Gness to be different, it
must be possible that it makes a difference, whether it is Fness or Gness
that is exemplified in a given situation. And if it makes a difference, one
has a nomological property the other lacks. From the perspective of the
CCI, to say, “there is no guarantee that two universals at a world have
different causal powers” (O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover, 1997, p. 107),
just means: There is no guarantee against counting the same universal
twice over; but counting it twice does not make it into two really dif-
ferent universals. The CCI gives us grounds to judge them identical if
they share all their causal powers. In this clash of doctrines, it seems
to me that the burden of proof lies on the opponent of the CCI who
postulates that there may be real differences which make no causal dif-
ference, because the CCI gains some a priori plausibility from the fact
that it is the metaphysical generalisation of a methodological principle,
grounding existence claims in science.
My second argument is more significant because less question begging
than the first. Even if we granted the possibility that there be two or
more indistinguishable yet numerically different universals, this would
not justify the conclusion that each has its own quiddity, making them
intrinsically different although they are qualitatively indistinguishable.
The argument from numerical difference with qualitative indiscernabil-
ity to a non-qualitative essence (or quiddity or haecceity) is in general
not valid, because it can be shown that it is not valid in the case of
particulars. So let us consider the analogous case for particulars.
Quantum mechanics teaches that there are systems of interacting fun-
damental particles of the same type and in the same state that contain a
number of perfectly indistinguishable particles. The particles constitu-
tive of such a system are numerically different yet qualitatively indistin-
guishable. With respect to these particles, let us construct an argument
that runs parallel to O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover’s argument for the
quiddity of universals. Its premise says that there is a set of partic-
x exists, our only justification is that the best available interpretation of all available facts
– an interpretation that will be either scientific or compatible with science – gives us reason
to believe in the existence of x. Such an inference to the best explanation does not of course
establish that those entities, in whose existence we have for the moment no good reason to
believe, do really not exist. It is only that there is no rational justification to believe in the
existence of anything that neither belongs to the empirical facts nor must be postulated to
account for these facts.
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ulars that are perfectly indistinguishable. (This corresponds to their
premise that there are the perfectly indistinguishable universals Fness
and Gness.) The premise is true for such particles. Nevertheless the
following reasoning shows that its conclusion is false: indistinguishable
particles do not have any individual haecceity making them intrinsically
though non-qualitatively different from each other. Redhead and Teller
(Redhead and Teller, 1992) call the hypothetical non-qualitative essence
of particulars – what I have called “haecceity” – “Transcendental Indi-
viduality” and characterise it as “that unifying principle of an individual
which is thought to transcend its attributes” (Redhead and Teller, 1992,
pp. 202f.). It “is not another property, but [. . . ] that by which an entity
allegedly acquires its identity” (ibid.). One of the roles of this concept of
a principle of individuation transcending the attributes (or qualitative
properties) of a particular – in our words, of a haecceity – is to be “that
in virtue of which the individual can bear a label, and that in virtue
of which the individual can be thought of as persisting through time
as one individual” (Redhead and Teller, 1992, p. 203). However, the
quantum statistics that correctly describes such systems of indiscernible
particles seems to be incompatible with the hypothesis that the particles
have a haecceity and can therefore be labelled differently. The point can
relatively simply be brought out in the following case. Consider two in-
distinguishable particles (more precisely, bosons) each of which can be in
one of two pure quantum states |ah > and |at > (as “head” and “tail”).
Then if these particles have haecceity, and can thus be labelled 1 and 2,
there seem to be four possibilities which should be equally probable:
1 |ah1 > |ah2 >: both particles are in state |ah >
2 |at1 > |at2 >: both particles are in state |at >
3 |ah1 > |at2 >: particle 1 is in state |ah > and
particle 2 is in state |at >
4 |at1 > |ah2 >: particle 1 is in state |at > and
particle 2 is in state |ah >
However, this a priori conception of the possible states of the system
is incompatible with the best available interpretation of the observed
phenomena. Quantum statistics requires counting what appears in this
presentation as two possibilities 3 and 4 as in fact only one possibility.
This makes an empirical difference for if the classical statistics were true
of the system, it would be twice as probable to find one particle in each
state, i.e. to find the state “3 or 4” than to find both particles in the
same state, |ah > or |at >, whereas it is, as a matter of empirical fact,
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equiprobable. Quantum mechanics accounts for this fact by postulating
that our two-particle system does not have four possible states available,
as it would have in a classical representation, but only three. These
correspond to the states 1 and 2, whereas the third is a mixed state
which can be represented as a superposition of the classical states 3 and
412.
O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover (O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover, 1997)
and others take the existence of systems of indistinguishable particles as
an argument in favour of haecceity13. However, Redhead and Teller
(Redhead and Teller, 1992) show that it doesn’t constitute such an ar-
gument, and that on the contrary, the supposition of the existence of
haecceities implicit in the labelling of the particles creates a puzzle,
which is dissolved by dropping that supposition. The puzzle is that,
as long as one rests with the classical representation and its idea that
each particle has its individual identity, which justifies attributing a la-
bel to it, the states 3 and 4 seem to be genuine possibilities, which
are never actualised. However, the existence of such possibilities has
no scientific grounding, the appearance of their existence flowing from
a metaphysical prejudice in favour of haecceities, reflected in labelling.
The empirical fact that such systems obey a statistics that corresponds
to the existence of three states suggests that there really are only three
possibilities, which can be explained by the hypothesis that such par-
ticles do not have any haecceity14. The situation seems to plead for
12What I have said is true only for bosons, which require a symmetric state description.
Fermions whose state description must be asymmetric cannot be in states 1 and 2, but must
be in a mixed asymmetric state. Cf. French and Redhead, 1988.
13Black presents a famous a priori argument for the same conclusion: It “is logically possible
that the universe should have contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres” (Black,
1952, p. 156). Similarly, Adams (Adams, 1979, p. 22) and Armstrong (Armstrong, 1997, p.
108) argue for haecceity in some possible world in which there exist two indistinguishable
counterparts of Earth one of which, at a certain time, ceases to exist. As Swinburne (Swin-
burne, 1995, p. 394) notes, an important weakness of such arguments is that they could at
best show that the objects existing in some possible world very distant from the actual one
have a haecceity – or “thisness”, as Swinburne calls it –, whereas it does not address the
question that primarily interests us, whether the material objects in the actual world have
a haecceity. Although it fails, the argument from the existence of indistinguishable particles
discussed in the text is relevant for this latter question, for quantum mechanics tells us that
they exist in the actual world.
14This reasoning seems to contradict Lewis’ view that “we do not find out by observation
what possibilities there are” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 112). If I am correct, then science is more
directly relevant for metaphysics than Lewis allows. Even if possibilities are established by
a purely a priori logical principle of recombination (Lewis, 1986a, p. 87), it is science that
determines the nature of the entities, particulars and properties, to be recombined. The
conflict can be resolved by observing that the relevance of science reaches only over the range
of nomologically possible worlds whereas Lewis notes the irrelevance of science with respect
to the determination of the full range of possibility, nomologically impossible possibility
included.
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Lowe’s (Lowe, 1998, p. 193) thesis that identity and countability do not
always go together: two indistinguishable particles do not have their
own individual identity although they are countable as two.
If this reasoning is correct, quantum mechanics shows that numerical
difference does not suffice to establish the existence of a non-qualitative
essence, or haecceity, in the case of particulars. Therefore this is not
a valid argument pattern that can be used, as O’Leary-Hawthorne and
Cover (O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover, 1997) do, to argue in the case
of universals that the hypothesis of two numerically different yet in-
distinguishable universals would imply that such universals would have
quiddity. To conclude the reasoning of the two preceding sections, we
have seen that O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover’s argument for the exis-
tence of a non-qualitative essence of universals is invalid, whereas the
kind of essence of universals whose existence Rosenkrantz’ argument al-
lows to establish, is too weak to be able to ground the contingency view.
For we have seen that the contingency view needs the essence of univer-
sals as a ground for their identity across different possible worlds, and
Rosenkrantz’ haecceities are not up to that task. Let us now look at the
second and stronger way to construe the identity of universals across
worlds: the claim that they are literally present in different worlds. It
will turn out that this conception has implications incompatible with
the contingency view.
4. Universals existing in different possible
worlds
Here is the way Lewis (Lewis, 1986a) conceives of the possibility that a
universal takes part in different laws in different possible worlds. Accord-
ing to Lewis, universals are subject to overlap between possible worlds,
in the sense that one and the same universal is part of several worlds.
Lewis refutes the idea that different worlds may overlap with respect
to individuals by arguing that this raises the paradox of accidental in-
trinsics (Lewis, 1986a, p. 201). An accidental property is a property an
individual c has at some worlds but lacks at other worlds. An intrinsic
property15 is determined exclusively by what is the case at the spatio-
temporal location of c, not by its relations to things located elsewhere.
To take Lewis’ example, if Humphrey himself (not Humphrey and his
counterpart, but one and the same individual Humphrey) exists in two
possible worlds, then the following inconsistency threatens. Having five
fingers on his right hand is an accidental intrinsic property Humphrey
15See (Lewis, 1999, chap. 5 and 6) on the difficulty of defining that concept.
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has in the actual world. It is intrinsic because it doesn’t depend on any-
thing distinct from Humphrey. And it is clearly accidental or contingent.
He has it at this world W1. But he might have had six fingers instead
of five. He lacks the property of having five fingers at world W2 where
he has six fingers on his right hand. However, it is inconsistent that
the same Humphrey has both five and six fingers on his right hand16.
Therefore, Lewis concludes that the hypothesis that Humphrey exists
in more than one possible world is wrong. There is no overlap between
worlds with respect to individuals.
However, Lewis thinks that no such inconsistency threatens in the
case of universals and that therefore there is no parallel reason plead-
ing against the possibility that different worlds overlap with respect to
universals. “A universal can safely be part of many worlds because it
hasn’t any accidental intrinsics.” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 205, note) According
to Lewis, the absence of accidental intrinsic properties makes it possible
to allow for an overlap between worlds in the case of universals: “I do
not see any parallel objection if worlds are said to overlap by sharing
a universal. What contingent, nonrelational property of the universal
could we put in place of [the] shape of the coin in raising the problem? I
cannot think of any.” (Lewis, 1983, p. 345, note 5)17 Lewis says, some-
what hesitantly, that first, “there isn’t much to the intrinsic nature of
a universal” (ibid.), and second, to the extent that a universal has in-
trinsic properties at all, they seem to be essential to it. He thinks of
such properties as being simple or composed. The extrinsic properties
are contingent and change from world to world, such as the property of
being instantiated N1 times in W1 and N2 times in W2. To sum up,
according to Lewis, the following is true of the properties of universals:
If they are intrinsic then they are essential (example: being simple or
being composed) and if they are extrinsic, then they are accidental (ex-
ample: the number of instantiations a universal has in a given world). If
we accept the claim that universals do not have any accidental intrinsic
properties, we can coherently suppose that a universal exists in more
than one possible world.
What properties do universals have? Those mentioned by Lewis –
being simple or composed, or being instantiated a certain number of
times – cannot be its only properties. The reason is that if these were
16As Lewis notes, there is no such problem with relational properties. Humphrey can possess
three dogs in W1 and four dogs in W2; he can be in a possession-relation to three W1-dogs,
and at the same time, without contradiction, in a possession-relation to four W2-dogs.
17If a coin was present in two different possible worlds, it could be the case that it was both
wholly round (in one world) and wholly octogonal (in the other world). This is the problem
of accidental intrinsics for objects.
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their only properties, all simple universals would be identical18 or at
least, if the number of instantiations were also taken into account, it
would be impossible that two simple universals be instantiated the same
number of times. However, this seems to be a quite realistic possibility:
if there is an exceptionless law linking primitive universals A and B
then they have the same number of instantiations. This is not question-
begging in favour of the necessity of laws, for it just supposes that there
is an exceptionless law that As are Bs in one world, e.g. in the actual
one. That this is possible is not controversial.
So universals must have other properties distinguishing them. Set-
ting aside the non-qualitative essences or quiddities discussed above,
the only plausible candidates seem to be their lawful dependencies on
one another. Our question is: are such relational properties accidental
or essential to the universal? Someone who holds, like Armstrong and
Lewis and in order to preserve modal intuitions, that they are acciden-
tal, must hold that they are extrinsic, on pains of falling victim to the
contradiction of accidental intrinsics, this times concerning properties of
universals.
It turns out to be sufficient to show that universals have intrinsic
properties, in order to show that, if they exist in more than one possi-
ble world then those properties are essential to them (for if they exist
in several possible worlds, then they cannot have accidental intrinsic
properties). If there are such properties, the link between the universal
and these properties has the strength of nomological necessity: it exists
in all worlds where the universal itself exists. Our question becomes:
Are there intrinsic properties which give rise to lawful dependencies of
a universal on other universals? These properties would be essential,
and so would be the links between universals, which are necessary laws.
Such intrinsic and essential properties of a universal would give rise to
nomological necessity in the sense given above: Truth in all worlds in
which the universal exists.
5. Necessary relations between determinate and
determinable universals
One intrinsic property of some universals is the property of deter-
minate universals to be subordinate (in Fregean terminology) to their
determinable universals. I shall argue that this relation is internal19
18I ignore the possibility of different but indistinguishable universals against which I have
argued above (section 3).
19I shall say of relations that they are internal if and only if they supervene on their terms,
and of a property that it is intrinsic if and only if it supervenes on its possessor.
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and that therefore the relation of subordination between a determinate
universal and its determinables is part of the essence of the determinate
universal. Being an equilateral triangle is a complex universal built from
the constituents: being a closed plane figure, of three sides, all sides of
equal length. Being a triangle is a determinable relative to being an
equilateral triangle, which is one of its determinates. E, being an equi-
lateral triangle, has the second-order property of being related – in fact
subordinate – to T , being a triangle20. The crucial point is that the re-
lation of subordination between determinate and determinable universal
is internal. An internal relation strongly supervenes on its terms; neces-
sarily, if both of the terms exist, they are so related. In other words, in
every world in which E and T exist, they are internally related so that
E entails T . In those worlds, necessarily, if something is E it also is T .
Moreover, the mere existence, in a world, of E, entails the existence in
that world, of T . There could not be a world in which E exists but not
T . Every world that contains equilateral triangles necessarily contains
triangles. Taken together, these two necessary implications entail that
being internally related to T is an internal relational property of E. It
is not only the case that if E and T both exist, they are necessary in-
ternally related by subordination of E under T , but also that if E exists
then it is necessarily internally related to T , for E’s existence alone is
sufficient for the existence of T . Being subordinate to T (by an internal
relation) is an essential intrinsic property of E: It is intrinsic because
the fact that E is subordinate to T does not depend on anything else
than E. To be subordinate to T is also an essential property of E: E
has it in every world in which it exists, because T is a constitutive part
of E. (T ’s identity is determined by a proper part of the terms of the
conjunction determining the identity of E.) Analogous arguments show
that E is essentially subordinate to all determinables corresponding to
any one of its constituents or to conjunctions of some (but not all) of its
constituents.
Our reasoning only depends on the premise that a determinate is
complex, conjunctively composed of its constituents. Nothing depends
on the particular example chosen. Therefore, it can be taken to establish
the following general claim on the relations between determinates and
determinables:
20One can, following Armstrong (Armstrong, 1997, chap. 4.13), conceive of determinate
universals as of complex universals resulting from a conjunctive combination of several con-
stituents. Suppression of one of its constituents yields a universal that is determinable rela-
tively to it. Worley (Worley, 1997) has elaborated Armstrong’s account of determinate and
determinable universals in a similar way.
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1 It is essential (nomologically21 necessary) for a determinate to be
subordinate to each of its determinables.
I would now like to propose an argument for the necessity of one law
of association, which uses 1 and the following premise.
2 It is essential (nomologically necessary) for a determinable D that
each of its instantiations is also an instantiation of at least one of
its determinates D1, . . . , Dn.
(∀x)(∀D)[Det(D)→ (Dx→ ∃Di ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn}Dix)]
where “Det” is the predicate “is a determinable”, and
{D1, . . . , Dn} is the set of determinates of the determinable D.
The reason for 2 is that determinable universals exist only insofar
as they are constituents of determinate universals. To be instantiated
alone, the determinable would have to exist independently of all its de-
terminates, in which case it would not be a determinable after all.
On the basis of these very general premises bearing on the relations
between determinables and their determinates, I shall now argue for one
case of a law of association22 that if it is true at all, then it is necessary23.
We may obtain this result if we add the following premise to 1 and 2.
Consider, as an example of a law of association, the Boyle-Mariotte
law of ideal gases. It says that an ideal gas which has pressure P , has
temperature T = PV/nR (where “V ” is the volume occupied by the
gas, “n” is the number of moles and “R” the universal gas constant).
3 In ideal gases24, T and P are two different determinables with
respect to the same set D of determinates25: the set of all states
of motion of the molecules composing the gas that share the mean
kinetic energy specific for T and P , given a fixed volume V .
21The qualifier “nomological” means that the relation holds in all worlds in which the property
exists.
22This argument bears only on laws of association, not on causal laws. But I shall argue later
that one may generalize from this case because it would be implausible that these kinds of
laws differ in their modal status.
23This claim must of course be distinguished from the obviously false claim that the law is a
priori. Kripke (Kripke, 1972) has made a convincing case for the existence of necessary yet
a posteriori truths. My thesis is that true law statements belong to this category.
24This restriction must be specified because T is multiply reducible; the temperature of empty
space, e.g., reduces to a different property.
25Similarly, Hooker (Hooker, 1981, p. 497) construes the relation between a liquid’s property
of boiling and the underlying microscopic property of the liquid as lying on the extreme ends
of a “determinate/determinable hierarchy”.
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From 3 alone it follows that, with the volume V fixed, the state of
motion determines both P and T . Given 3 we already know that it is
naturally necessary that any gas in one of the states in this set has both
T and P .
The crucial question is: Is the relation between the macroscopic prop-
erties T and P that is the content of the Boyle-Mariotte law also neces-
sary? We can derive a positive answer from our premises in the follow-
ing way. By premise 2, the instantiation by the gas of the determinable
property P is necessarily also an instantiation of at least one determinate
property, which is in set D. By 1, each instantiation of a determinate
is also an instantiation of each of its determinables, but by 3, T is such
a determinable property for all states in D. Hence, an instantiation of
P is necessarily an instantiation of T . On the construal of the Boyle-
Mariotte law given in 3, as a relation between two determinables that
have the same set of determinates, it follows from general properties of
the determinate/determinable relation that the law is necessary if true.
The necessity of this law is however not of a logical nature because the
necessity of premise 3 is not logical. The analysis of the determination of
the macroscopic properties of an object by the properties and relations
of its parts is a controversial topic, but this determination is certainly
not logical26.
Without trying to argue for this claim here, it seems that an anal-
ysis along these lines is available for many laws of association between
different higher-level properties of macroscopic complex objects, such as
the Wiedemann-Franz law (stating the proportionality between electri-
cal and thermal conductivity in metals) or the Dulong-Petit law (stating
that the specific heat of solids has a constant universal value, which is
independent of the type of solid and of the temperature within a given
range). It is the empirical discovery of micro-reductions that must jus-
tify the truth of a premise analogue to 3 in each case. Therefore, the
argument cannot be generalised to establish the necessity of laws of asso-
ciation between fundamental properties of microscopic particles. But if
our argument is correct and if premise 3 is correct for the Boyle-Mariotte
law, then we have shown that there exist necessary laws of association.
And then it can be argued that it is implausible for different laws of
association to differ in modal status.
What about causal laws? Causal laws are laws linking what happens
at different spatio-temporal locations. Conservation laws are an impor-
tant class of such laws. There are two reasons to consider that they are
26Armstrong (Armstrong, 1989) denies the existence of non-logical necessity. His arguments
will be discussed shortly.
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necessary in the same non-logical sense as laws of association. First, it
is implausible to attribute a different modal status to causal laws and
to laws of association for their modal status should be a consequence
of their lawful status. Second, we can apply the Causal Criterion of
Identity to conserved quantities. Take the conservation of mass-energy.
The law of its conservation is necessary in the nomological sense that it
holds wherever this quantity exists: it is constitutive for being the total
energy-mass of a closed and isolated system to be conserved27. If some
energy-like quantity of such a system is not conserved, we conclude that
it is just one form of energy, such as potential energy or kinetic energy,
but not total energy. The law of the conservation of total energy – which
is a causal law in the sense that it determines what happens over time
(and space28) – is necessary because mass-energy and other fundamental
conserved quantities are conceptually linked to conservation. A property
which exists in some possible world but which is not conserved is not
one of them. Once again this is less than one might have hoped for. I
have tried to show, not that all causal laws are necessary but only that
there exist necessary causal laws29.
Let me prevent a misinterpretation that might easily arise. We have
not shown that laws are necessary in the strong sense of holding in all
possible worlds. Nothing I have said prevents the existence of strange
possible worlds in which there are no conservation laws. It is just that
such worlds do not contain conserved quantities. The conservation of
total mass-energy is necessary only in this sense: in all those worlds in
which mass-energy exists, it is conserved.
27Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse argue that our actual world is the unique individual of a natural
kind, and that conservation laws are grounded in this natural kind. “Conservation laws are
best understood as ascribing properties to the world as a whole, properties which are essential
to the natural kind to which our world belongs” (Bigelow et al., 1992, p. 385). Within this
framework, the view defended here could be formulated in the following way. To be conserved
is an essential property of a property of the whole world, the property of having a given total
mass-energy.
28An energetically closed system may travel through space.
29If all laws were reducible to laws of association, it would not be necessary to argue separately
for the existence of necessary causal laws. Against Russell (Russell, 1986) who argues that
functional laws of association are the only laws, Cartwright (Cartwright, 1979) argues that
causal laws cannot be reduced to such laws of association. Without trying to settle this issue
here, the fact that conservation laws put constraints on the evolution of systems over time,
whereas laws of association only constrain the properties of a system at one time, pleads
prima facie against the possibility of a reduction of the former to the latter.
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6. Incompatibilities between different
determinates of one determinable
There is another source of nomological necessity: it follows from the
incompatibility of different determinates of the same determinable. It is
essential (nomologically necessary) for determinables that their instan-
tiations are instantiations of only one of their determinates. In other
words, different determinates exclude each other. No closed plane figure
can be both triangular and quadrilateral, and no object (Lewis’ exam-
ple) can have both a positive and negative electric charge at the same
time. In this section, I try to show that these are cases of nomologi-
cal necessity, against Armstrong’s (Armstrong, 1989) attempts to show
that all cases of apparent nomological incompatibility can be reduced to
logical or otherwise analytical necessity, and are therefore not cases of
natural necessity.
According to Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility, any two
states of affairs, a’s being F and a’s being G, are compossible if the
universals F and G are entirely distinct. Armstrong’s strategy to deal
with apparent examples of natural necessity is to recognise the necessity
of logical and other analytic relations, to count mereological relations as
analytic, and then to show that wherever there are necessary relations
between states of affairs, their necessity can be traced back to a logical
or mereological source. He concludes that there is no genuinely natural
but only logical necessity.
Let us see whether Armstrong can establish this reduction of nomo-
logical to logical/mereological necessity. Among the many cases of states
of affairs which consist in the attribution of different determinate prop-
erties of a given determinable to one particular at one time30, Armstrong
analyses the property of mass31. A given particular can have only one
determinate mass at a given time. Armstrong reduces the incompatibil-
ity of two states of affairs attributing two different masses to the same
particular at the same time, to a mereological and thus purely analytic,
not natural incompatibility. Masses are structural universals. Mereo-
30We can see Armstrong’s analysis as a reply to Lewis’ refutation of the “linguistic ersatzer”,
by way of showing that not everything that can be stated is a genuine possibility. “It is
consistent, says Lewis, in the narrowly logical sense, to say that something is both positive
and negative. [. . . ] This seems wrong: here we seem to have an inconsistency which is not
narrowly logical, but arises because positive and negative charge are two determinates of one
determinable.” (Lewis, 1986a, p. 154) According to Lewis, the “ersatzer” must introduce an
axiom into his world-making language to prevent that the theory predicts that it is possible
that a thing is both positive and negative. If such axioms are indeed necessary, it shows that
modality cannot be reduced to linguistic combinations (which is what the “ersatzer” claims).
31Cf. Armstrong, 1989, p. 78f. Elsewhere (Armstrong, 1997, chap. 4), he applies the same
strategy to duration.
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logical considerations of the relation of the constituents of a structural
universal to the whole explain the incompatibility of two states of af-
fairs according to which the same particular c has both a quantity of
one and of five kilograms. The explanation is that c’s having a mass of
five kg is equivalent to a conjunction of five states of affairs according
to which five parts of c have one kg of mass each. But if the whole
particular c instantiates the structural universal of having a mass of five
kg, then it is necessary in the sense of “analytic” (Armstrong, 1989, p.
80) that it cannot also have the property of having a mass of one kg
because this is, analytically – as a consequence of the meaning of the
predicate “having a mass of five kg” – the property of one of c’s proper
parts. In Armstrong’s words, “to attempt to combine the two properties
in one thing would involve the thing’s being identical with its proper
part” (Armstrong, 1989, p. 79; similarly Armstrong, 1997, chap. 4.13).
In Lewis’ terms, no special non-logical axiom has to be introduced in
order to guarantee that something cannot have both one kg and five kg
of mass. The axioms of mereology suffice, if one makes the hypothesis
that determinate universals are structural.
Armstrong’s strategy to deal with the incompatibility of different de-
terminates of one determinable consists in reducing the incompatibility
between universals to a mereological kind of impossibility: that a whole
cannot share a universal with one of its proper parts. Several objections
have been raised against this analysis some of which are relevant to our
topic. Let me mention two cases in which Armstrong’s analysis seems
to fail: the masses of fundamental particles and colours.
Armstrong’s attempt to explain incompatibilities by partial identi-
ties presupposes that all those quantities that are not freely combinable
are structural properties. But it is implausible that all quantities are
structural: The masses of fundamental particles are not. As Menzies
(Menzies, 1992, p. 733) notes, it contradicts current scientific doctrine
to suppose that the masses of fundamental particles are structural prop-
erties. The properties of fundamental particles directly contradict Arm-
strong’s claim that “if an individual has an extensive quantity, then it
has parts which lie outside each other, that is which are numerically dif-
ferent from each other, and which go together to make up the individual
and to give the individual the particular quantity that it has.” (Arm-
strong, 1989, p. 80) The electron doesn’t have its mass me by virtue of
having two proper parts having each 1/2me32. So why isn’t it possible
32One might try to replace the claim that determinate universals are “structural” by the
claim that they are “complex”. The sense Armstrong (Armstrong, 1978, chap. 18) gives
the term “structural” as applied to universals, implies that a structural universal can only
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that an electron has both me and 1/2me? Armstrong anticipates the
objection that his mereological analysis may be inapplicable to incom-
patibilities between extensive quantities of fundamental particles. He
notes that “there are grounds for thinking that, at a fundamental level,
our example of mass is irreducibly intensive. For the truly fundamen-
tal particles are thought of as point-masses.” (Armstrong, 1989, p. 80)
Let us then turn to Armstrong’s attempt to explain incompatibilities
between intensive qualities.
Some intensive qualities, such as density, are according to Armstrong
reducible to extensive quantities. Density is reducible to volume and
mass, which are both extensive. “As a result, incompatibilities of den-
sity can be resolved into incompatibilities of volume and mass.” (Arm-
strong, 1989, p. 80) But presumably (as already hinted at with respect
to mass) there are also what seem to be irreducibly intensive qualities,
which cannot be thus reduced to a proportion of extensive quantities.
For these Armstrong proposes the strategy to apply a sort of mereologi-
cal analysis based on the postulation of non-spatial parts. “Why should
we not say that if science sees fit to postulate apparently irreducible
intensive quantities, then what is really being postulated is the simul-
taneous presence of many individuals at the same place?” (Armstrong,
1989, p. 81; similarly Armstrong, 1997, chap. 4.22) If we follow Arm-
strong in considering the mass of fundamental particles as intensive, we
could try to consider that a neutron has a proton and an electron as
non-spatial parts.
I have three objections against this idea. First, it would explain just
two incompatibilities (something cannot be both a neutron and a proton
nor a neutron and an electron) and leave many others unexplained. It
cannot, e.g., explain why nothing can be both a proton and a photon.
be exemplified by complex particulars (the parts of which exemplify constituents of the
structural universal), which is not necessary for all determinates. (In Armstrong, 1997, chap.
3.71, he says that this is true only of “paradigm structural properties”. One could also call
conjunctive properties “structural” although in its case, “the constituents, the conjuncts,
are properties of the very same particular that has the conjunctive property”.) One could
make the hypothesis that determinate universals are not structural but rather “complex”
universals, which could be exemplified even by fundamental particles that have no parts.
But this move would destroy the terms of Armstrong’s above-mentioned argument, to the
effect that the incompatibility of the exemplification of different determinates of the same
determinable by one particular at one time has a purely mereological (and thus analytic)
origin. It could be saved only by making the hypothesis that the particulars exemplifying
complex universals have non-spatial parts even if they have no spatial parts. I discuss this
hypothesis shortly.
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Second, the hypothesis seems to be ad hoc33: Armstrong’s justification
to rely on mereology for explaining apparent incompatibilities was that
such incompatibilities are clearly understood, in the end because they
are analytical. But this certainly isn’t true for a hypothetical theory
that would be in some sense analogous to mereology but where non-
spatial parts are combined into non-spatial wholes. No such theory
has been worked out, and it seems gratuitous to rely on the hope that
there could be such a theory that would provide the correct results.
Third, such a theory would not be analytic in the same sense as the
theorems of mereology. Even if we grant that there is a sense in which
a neutron results from the “addition” of a proton and an electron, this
sort of addition is not a logical operation: the properties of the resulting
whole are not predictable on the grounds of logic alone, but require the
knowledge of empirical laws. The masses of the “parts”, the electron
and the proton, do not, e.g., add up to the mass of the “whole”, the
neutron, according to the arithmetic law of addition but according to a
more complex empirical law.
Armstrong faces a similar dilemma in the case of the incompatibility of
determinate colours. In the case of colours – which Armstrong proposes
to consider as extensive structural properties in the same way as mass
– it is not only possible but on the contrary normally the case that the
proper parts of a red object are themselves red34. So why cannot both
the whole and one of its parts share the universal of having a mass of
five kg?
Armstrong argues that colours are only phenomenologically simple
but can be reduced to structured physical properties. Taking up a sug-
gestion of the Tractatus (6.3751), Armstrong (Armstrong, 1989, pp. 82–
84) holds that secondary qualities such as colours are to be identified
with “primary-quality structures” (Armstrong, 1989, p. 83). He sug-
gests that incompatibilities between the latter can always be reduced to
incompatibilities between extensive quantities. But he doesn’t show this
in detail for any secondary quality. What he does instead is show how
this strategy works for explaining the incompatibility between different
velocities, and then declare without further argument that the same
strategy works for secondary qualities. But it seems that if colours, e.g.,
can be reduced to complex physical structural properties, such as the
capacity of reflecting light of certain wavelengths, these reducing prop-
33Only in this context does Armstrong consider such a possibility. Elsewhere, he takes
it as obvious that “two material objects cannot be at the same place at the same time.”
(Armstrong, 1968, p. 240)
34Cf. (Macdonald, 1991, p. 162).
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erties are intensive. The impossibility of a photon’s being both of the
wavelength 500 A˚ and 1000 A˚, does not stem from its being composed of
two parts with a wavelength of 500 A˚ each, short of making the doubtful
hypothesis of non-spatial parts (Cf. Menzies, 1992, 733)35,36.
In the end, after this look at Armstrong’s suggestion to account for
incompatibilities between intensive qualities in terms of a speculative
non-spatial mereology, we arrive at the conclusion that these incom-
patibilities are irreducible to logical or mereological incompatibilities.
Against both Armstrong and Lewis, I suggest that these incompatibil-
ities are instances of natural necessity, which have the same origin as
necessary laws of nature, for which we have argued above37.
35My objection is that Armstrong’s strategy to show that the incompatibility is grounded
on a partial identity between the incompatible states of affairs, and thus on a mereological
incompatibility, doesn’t work. Bradley (Bradley, 1989, p. 36) objects that it is ad hoc: I
think that this objection is justified only where Armstrong applies it to properties for which
our best current scientific theories gives us grounds for thinking that they are simple. It is
ad hoc to overrule science and simply postulate that there must be hidden structure in order
for there to be a solution to a difficulty encountered by the philosophical theory. This looks
like, in Lewis words, “letting philosophy dictate to science” (Lewis, 1992, p. 212). But with
respect to colours, the objection seems misdirected for here science does give us grounds for
thinking that colours are complex properties.
36Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 35) considers a similar analysis of intensive qualities
as conjunctions of their parts, and rejects it for reasons similar to those indicated in the text.
37Several authors have defended the thesis that laws of nature are necessary although not
always in the sense intended here, of holding in all worlds that share our actual universals, and
for reasons different from those presented in this paper. Cf. Shoemaker, 1980, Shoemaker,
1998, Swoyer, 1982, Fales, 1993, Bigelow et al., 1992, Ellis and Lierse, 1994, and Ellis, 1999,
Ellis, 2000, Ellis, 2001. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the differences between
the accounts offered by these authors and mine (Cf. Kistler, 2002). Let me just note that
the position defended here differs from Ellis’ and Lierse’s “dispositional essentialism” (DE)
in several important respects. First, according to DE, laws are grounded in dispositions
that are essential properties of natural kinds, which are primitive and fundamental kinds of
entities. On the view defended here, it is the essential nomological properties of properties
(here construed as universals) that provide the grounding of laws. My main reason for holding
that (simple) properties are more fundamental than natural kinds is that kinds are complex
types of substances, which share structural properties. But the constituents of the structure
are held together in virtue of laws governing those constituent properties. So it seems that
the identity of a kind depends on the identity of its constitutive properties. Second, the
fundamental essences of DE are causal powers belonging to natural kinds. I have argued
more generally for the existence of essential nomological properties of properties, of which
causal powers are only a special kind. Third, according to DE, if a disposition 〈C,E〉 to
have the effect E in circumstances C is “causally determinate”, then “an event of the kind E
must occur to x [. . . ] as a result of a C-type event occurring to x at t” (Ellis, 2001, p. 130).
However, perfectly deterministic dispositions do not obey this condition because their effects
are typically themselves dispositional and do not always manifest themselves in a way that
only depends on C. For example, a negative electrical charge at point P has the disposition
(in virtue of a deterministic law) to create an electrical field that has, at some point Q distant
from P , the strength E. But if, as will generally be the case, the charge is not the only one
around, the total electrical field strength at Q will not be E, as determined by the charge at
P ; the total field strength will result rather from the superposition of many dispositions for
an electrical field at Q.
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7. Conclusion
Starting from the idea that laws are second-order relations between
properties, and thus equivalent to second-order relational properties of
properties, I have argued for the thesis that at least some of these nomo-
logical properties of properties are essential to them, in the sense that
the first-order property would not be the property it is if it did not pos-
sess the second-order nomological property. If this is true then the laws
corresponding to these nomological properties are necessary in a partic-
ular sense: although they do not hold in all possible worlds – they are
not logically necessary – they hold in all worlds in which the first-order
properties exist.
To establish the thesis of the nomological necessity of at least some
laws, I have first argued against two important ways of justifying a cru-
cial requirement for the opposite thesis: if the laws of nature were con-
tingent, the universals taking part in them would have to have an essence
independent of their lawful relations to other universals. I have tried to
show that Rosenkrantz’ “haecceities” are not tied to criteria of identity
which could ground their identity and difference across different possi-
ble worlds. Furthermore, I have shown Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne’s
argument for the existence of “quiddities” of universals, based upon the
alleged possibility of the existence of indistinguishable universals, to be
invalid.
Second, I have given two positive arguments for the necessity of at
least some laws of nature. The first concerns laws of association link-
ing different properties that are instantiated at the same time at the
same place. If a law linking macroscopic properties such as the Boyle-
Mariotte law linking the temperature, pressure and volume of an ideal
gas can be construed as linking different determinables of the same class
of determinates, then the logic of the relations between determinates
and determinables allows to establish that it is necessary if it is true.
The second argument regards the impossibility of several determinates
of the same determinable to be instantiated by the same particular at
a given time. I have tried to show that such incompatibilites require
the postulate of a specific nomological type of necessity, against Arm-
strong’s argument that it can be reduced to analytic (more precisely
mereological) necessity. Insofar as this necessity is not analytic, it gives
us a reason to postulate nomological necessity as a fundamental kind of
necessity.
As we have seen in the beginning of the paper, Lewis’ Humean com-
binatorialism allows laws of association to be necessary insofar as they
constrain relations between different aspects of events, in other words
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because they constrain only what is the case at one spatio-temporal
location. Although Lewis (Lewis, 1986a, p. 114) thinks that we have
neither reasons for nor against the hypothesis that laws of association
are necessary, the latter thesis is compatible with Lewis’ Humean combi-
natorialism, which postulates independence only between what happens
at different space-time regions. However, Armstrong’s stronger Tractar-
ian combinatorialism requires that even relations between facts obtain-
ing at the same spatio-temporal location are contingent except if they
are reducible to logical or otherwise analytic relations. Our conclusion,
that laws of association are necessary, is therefore incompatible with
Armstrong’s metaphysical framework. Furthermore, our conclusion that
causal laws, such as laws of conservation, are necessary is incompatible
with both Lewis’ and Armstrong’s metaphysics.
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